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Weakness of Will: Reformation Anthropology between Aristotle and the Stoa 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
The so-called weakness of will, sometimes called with the Greek term akrasia or the Latin 
term incontinentia, belongs to those perennial topics of Western philosophy that each new 
generation wants to elaborate and discuss. Akrasia means acting against better judgment, that 
is, the situation in which one knows what good one ought to do but nevertheless does 
something else.1   
     The theme of akrasia is usually considered to have its origins in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, (EN, Book VII), in which Aristotle discusses the phenomenon of acting against one’s 
own better judgment. Since knowledge is stronger than opinions or emotions, and since better 
judgments represent this knowledge, no rational person should act against what he or she 
considers best. Aristotle is, however, not only intellectualist but also realist; therefore, he 
remarks that often people nevertheless seem to act akratically. How can this phenomenon be 
explained? Aristotle presents a lengthy elaboration and explanation. Later philosophers and 
theologians have debated what Aristotle is actually saying and whether he is right in saying 
what he says.2 
 
Akrasia in Aristotle and the Stoa 
 
As one crucial part of his explanation, Aristotle launches the practical syllogism, a calculative 
model of the emergence of human action. The practical syllogism consists of a major premise 
that expresses a general principle and a minor premise that states a particular observation. 
Given the intellectualist framework, rational beings should follow the conclusion implied by 
the two premises. Aristotle’s famous example in EN VII concerns eating: “Sweet things are 
to be avoided” (major); “this is sweet” (minor); “this should be avoided” (conclusion). The 
conclusion is not only propositional, but also functional and in some sense the action itself. 
Hence, a person’s acts result from his or her calculative deliberations in terms of practical 
syllogism. (EN VII, 1145a-1147b). 
     The standard Aristotelian answer to the problem of akrasia is that the akratic person 
knows the good in a universal sense but his grasp of the minor premise is impeded or 
imperfect. Thus, the akratic person eats the sweets, knowing that sweet things should 
generally be avoided, but cheating himself to ignore the particular case at hand. (EN VII, 
1147a-b). Obviously, the next thing to ask is whether the ignorance in question is voluntary 
or not. A great range of different answers has been presented, and sometimes the same author 
has presented many answers. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, says that philosophically such 
behavior is like involuntary forgetting, but theologically it is voluntary.3 
                                                 
1 TOBIAS HOFFMANN (ed.) Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, Washington 
2008. JÖRN MÜLLER, Willensschwäche in Antike und Mittelalter, Leuven 2009. RISTO 
SAARINEN, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, Oxford, 2011. 
2 MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), pp. 109-151; SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), 
pp. 8-12. 
3 So SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 28-30. More discussion about Aquinas is 
listed here. 
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     In addition to Aristotle, there is a Stoic tradition of akrasia of which the scholars have 
become better aware during the last fifteen years.4 The Stoic tradition is quite fragmentary; 
we have some texts of Chrysippus and Galen, and uncertain mentions from Plutarch, 
Epictetus and Origen. I am also arguing in my new book that Augustine is in some ways 
connected to this tradition.5  
     The Stoic tradition survives in some examples, of which the two most popular are, first, 
“the runner who cannot stop running” and, second, the literary figure of Medea who falls in 
love and kills her children against her better judgment. Both Medea’s love and her rage are 
used as example of akrasia. The Stoics introduced the concept of assent to their anthropology. 
This assent was no free will in the modern sense, but something that is immediately attached 
to the judgment of the mind. According to the Stoics, our emotions are assented judgments. 
When we feel an emotion, we have already judged to assent it. Emotions are no innocent 
desires but assented judgments. Thus the Stoics are in some sense even more intellectualist 
that the Aristotelians who taught that the emotions stem from the lower parts of the soul, 
being in themselves no rational judgment or voluntary consent of higher mental powers.6  
     As strict intellectualists, the Stoics are unwilling to admit that there exists something like 
akrasia. Motivational mental conflicts only mean that the assented judgment oscillates and 
changes in both directions so rapidly that we cannot notice the individual instances of this 
rapid change. However, in each individual instance of this very rapid oscillation there is a 
coherence of assent, judgment and the emotion representing them.7 
     However, the Stoics discuss two possible options of akrasia. First, there may be so-called 
prepassions, which emerge already before judgment. If I see a box of sweets in the shop 
window, this impression may cause tiny physical changes within me before the judgment, 
assent and emotion are fully formed in the soul. Such tiny changes could be labeled as 
akratic, and we may have them for a very brief time before the conscious judgment emerges. 
Although the doctrine of prepassions became prominent in later Christian monastic 
spirituality, the other option is more interesting for the purposes of this paper. In some cases, 
the agent may be so strongly predetermined by some earlier habits that the new information 
cannot change his or her course of action immediately but only after delay. This is what the 
example of the “runner who cannot stop running” illustrates. After the assented judgment to 
stop running, the runner proceeds at least for some meters. This proceeding might be called 
akrasia, acting against one’s own better judgment.8 
     This was also how Medea’s love and her rage came to be interpreted. In Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses Medea claims to “see the better and approve it, but follow the worse”. This 
means, according to the Stoic view, that she saw that it was better to stay at her father’s 
home, but her love nevertheless caused her to continue with Jason. Although she 
intellectually decided to stay with her father, her earlier course of life was still so 
predominant that in her love she actually followed Jason.9  
                                                 
4 MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), pp. 155-193 offers a broad overview.  
5 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 19-27. 
6 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 12-17. 
7 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 15 and MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), p. 
167-171. 
8 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 16 and MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), pp. 
171-179. 
9 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 16-17; MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), 
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      Jörn Müller has meticulously analyzed the Stoic tradition of akrasia; he also discusses its 
relationship to some early Christian mental conflicts, for instance, Paul’s introspection in 
Romans 7. In my own book, I present two new arguments concerning Augustine’s very 
complex role in this story. First, I claim that Augustine’s famous conversion story in 
Confessions 8 displays similarities with the example of the “runner who cannot stop 
running”. Here Augustine wonders why the commandment of the mind to will does not bring 
about a will-act, calling this powerless will a monstrosity. He explains the phenomenon by 
saying that, though the mind is lifted up by truth, it is also weighed down heavily by habit, 
and it is this old habit which causes the person to act against his better will and judgment.10 
     Second, I interpret the late Augustine’s pessimistic lines of the remaining sinfulness of 
Christians as saying that Augustine there regards concupiscence not only as irrational 
emotion but also in terms of an assented judgment. Because we feel concupiscence, we have 
somehow already assented to it; therefore, the awareness of one’s feeling concupiscence is 
already in itself sinful, involving preceding consent in some sense. In fact, the case of 
Augustine is very complex. His doctrine of desire, consent and free will cannot be reduced to 
Stoicism but it also exemplifies new developments. At the same time, the notion of 
consent/assent stems from Stoicism and we may ask to what extent this shapes Augustine’s 
thinking. Timo Nisula discusses Augustine in detail, without fully agreeing with my views 
regarding his Stoicism.11 For my purposes, it is sufficient to show that Augustine can be read 
in somewhat Stoic terms. This is relevant in the reception history irrespectively of whether 
this was the case with the historical Augustine. 
 
Other Introductory Perspectives 
 
Some introductory perspectives need to be stated clearly, before I can enter the topic. 
      First, it is evident that since Melanchthon the Reformation authors knew much more 
about Stoicism than was the case in late medieval scholasticism. Several Reformation authors 
knew well the non-religious Greek sources and could thus compare their theology 
competently with the classical heritage. Thus, we have not only Aristotelianism but also a 
kind of Neo-Stoicism as an available option in the Reformation era. 
     Second, I will not claim that the Reformation authors were either Aristotelians or Stoics. 
They differed from both in many important respects. However, some of them are Aristotelian 
in their explanation of akrasia, whereas others employ distinctly Neo-Stoic features. While 
they all remain somewhere between Aristotle and the Stoa, it is worthwhile to discover the 
individual affinities and differences. 
      Third, to verify such discoveries we need a clear framework of relevant comparisons. For 
this purpose, I will employ a categorization of the different models of akrasia as being either 
Aristotelian or Stoic. The use of practical syllogism as explanatory model is typical of 
Aristotelianism. Within this model, one may have slightly different explanations as to how 
the syllogism can go wrong, but I will not address them in the following. The Stoic models 
are characterized by the use of the concepts of assent/ consent/ free will. They proceed from 
                                                                                                                                                        
pp.173-176. 
10 MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), pp.211-241 (Paul); SAARINEN, Weakness 
(see n. 1), pp. 17-26 (Augustine).  
11 TIMO NISULA, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence, Leiden, esp. pp. 
259-262. 
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strictly Stoic intellectualism towards Augustinianism, and further from Augustinianism 
towards voluntarism. While the full-fledged free will models are no longer Stoic, the 
Augustinian models that employ the interplay of desire and consent still display some Stoic 
features. 12 
     Fourth, the role of Martin Luther in this history needs to be explained. In some sense, he 
does not belong to it, since he did not write anything on akrasia. In my new book, I ask the 
inevitable question: why not, given that he knew Aristotle well and was so interested in the 
so-called bondage of the will. My answer is that, for Luther, akrasia was not a conceptual 
option in the first place.13 Why is this so? For Aristotle, akrasia and enkrateia, the strength of 
will, are imperfect stages of virtue and vice. Imperfectly good people act virtuously but have 
temptations to do otherwise. They are called enkratic or (in Latin) continent. Imperfectly evil 
people commit sins but they act against their better judgment, being akratic. In Aristotle, we 
thus have four moral states, virtue, continence, akrasia, and vice. 
    For Luther, however, all people without grace are wholeheartedly evil and sinful; there are 
no alleviating factors. For this reason, people who claim to be akratic are just normally evil 
and maybe hypocrites. When people are justified and live a Christian life, they act rightly but 
their ruled sin nevertheless tempts them all the time. They are righteous and sinner at the 
same time. In Aristotelian terms, they are continent rather than virtuous. If Christians lapse 
from the good course of life, they re-enter the state of normal sinners. When they return to the 
path of faith and Christianity, they become righteous sinners or continent in Aristotelian 
terms. Only in heaven can they become really good and virtuous. The four Aristotelian moral 
states are thus reduced to two in Luther, namely, vice and continence. Given this, Luther need 
not write anything concerning people who without grace nevertheless have good judgment: 
there are no such people. 
 
Early Lutheranism 
 
We can also bluntly say that Luther kicked Aristotle out of the door. The philosopher starts to 
creep back from one window opened by Melanchthon and another opened by Calvin. 
Melanchthon does not write much thematically on akrasia. For the most part, he shares 
Luther’s view that only sinfulness and continence are the real Christian options.  
Melanchthon’s portrayal of the human will is Lutheran rather than Erasmian or Humanist.14  
     In the second aetas of the Loci communes, however, Melanchthon undertakes some 
moderations to Luther’s teaching concerning the natural powers of humanity without grace. 
He considers that people can have a remnant of judgment with which they can proceed to 
externally good works. The weakness of our nature frequently overcomes any good 
judgment, so that we follow evil affects. Medea’s words: I see the better and approve it, but 
follow the worse, exemplify this situation.15  
                                                 
12 A detailed categorization is presented in SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 42, 
217. 
13 See SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 115-132. 
14 So TIMOTHY WENGERT, Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness, Oxford 1998. 
15 MELANCHTHON, Corpus Reformatorum (CR, Halle, 1834-1860) v. 21, p. 374: 
“Hanc ipsam libertatem efficiendae civilis iustitiae saepe vinci naturali imbecillitate, saepe 
impediri a Diabolo. Nam cum natura sit plena malorum affectuum, saepe obtemperant 
homines pravis cupiditatibus, non recto iudicio. Sicut inquit apud Poetam Medea: Video 
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      Medea’s words are not used in medieval theology and philosophy, but they are 
reintroduced by Josse Clichtove in his influential ethics textbook around 1500 as illustration 
of akrasia. After Clichtove and Melanchthon, they are used by practically all later writers.16 
More importantly, they were used as an example of weakness of will, not as any example 
whatsoever. Melanchthon is very fond of Medea’s example; he interprets Medea’s love and 
her rage in several different works throughout his later career as Reformer.17 Let us keep in 
mind that Medea’s words are non-Aristotelian: if Medea really saw the better, without any 
ignorance or forgetting, she, according to Aristotle’s intellectualist theory, should have 
followed this course. Medea exemplifies something that is called clear-eyed akrasia in 
philosophical literature. 
     We know today how the example of Medea was employed in the Stoic discussion on 
akrasia.18 Therefore, we need to ask whether the reintroduction of this example by Clichtove 
and Melanchthon implies the reintroduction of Stoicism into the discussion on weakness of 
will. Several qualifications are here needed, as Medea’s example can be understood as being 
simply voluntarist. In some respects, Melanchthon’s interpretation resembles Aristotelianism: 
the akratic Medea ignores the good judgment at the very moment of her sinful action. 
Melanchthon sometimes says that the devil causes this ignorance of particulars.19  
      On the other hand, Melanchthon knew the Greek sources so well that he probably realized 
that the example of Medea manifests Stoic rather than Aristotelian action theory. The 
frequent use of this example turns, I think, his action theory to some extent towards the Stoa. 
Melanchthon’s significance in the interpretation history of akrasia lies, however, primarily in 
his ability to reconnect the classical discussion with the emerging Lutheran theology. His use 
of the relevant examples is eclectic and rhetorical rather than fully consistent. 
     The first Lutheran to develop a sophisticated, original and highly tradition-conscious 
notion of akrasia is Melanchthon’s pupil Joachim Camerarius. He is clearly a major figure 
not only in Lutheranism, but also in the entire interpretation history of akrasia in Western 
philosophy. His insights radiate far and deep, up to such founding fathers of modernity as 
Spinoza and Leibniz.20  Here I can only very briefly sketch some basic features of 
Camerarius’s Exposition of Nicomachean Ethics. 
      Camerarius knows well the Platonic and Stoic traditions, but he adheres to 
Aristotelianism, which he attempts to harmonize with Melanchthon’s theological and 
philosophical insights. He keeps the structure of the practical syllogism and argues, in 
keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, that the particular facts of the minor premise are not 
grasped properly in the akratic deliberation. Thus, some ignorance precedes akratic acts. 
                                                                                                                                                        
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Praeterea Diabolus captivam naturam impellit ad varia 
flagitia etiam externa, sicut videmus summos viros, qui tamen conati sunt honeste vivere, 
lapsus turpissimos habere. Sed tamen inter has difficultates, utcunque reliqua est aliqua 
libertas efficiendae iustitiae civilis.” 
16 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 79-83 (Clichtove).  
17 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 132-142. 
18 MÜLLER, Willensschwäche (see n. 1), pp. 165-179. 
19 See above n. 15. 
20 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 142-151 (Camerarius), pp. 225-229 (Spinoza, 
Leibniz).  
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Unlike the former Aristotelians, however, Camerarius considers that the uncertainty related to 
our perception of empirical particular is nothing less than “the cause of all evil”.21 
     He gives three new and non-Aristotelian examples of akrasia, which signify this 
circumstance in a very broad manner. A medical doctor knows well the general regularities 
regarding how to treat fever. However, it is very difficult to know which general principle 
applies to this particular case of fever. Therefore, he often fails to heal, as the medical 
knowledge concerning particulars is not certain. The second example concerns political 
leadership, in which even wise men often fail for the same reason: they know the general 
rules, but they cannot foresee whether they work properly in this particular case. A third 
example concerns the composition of literary texts: even very skillful authors make all kinds 
of blunders, as the procedure from general stylistic and rhetorical rules to concrete cases of 
writing convincingly is so hard to accomplish.22 
     The error of the akratic person thus concerns the particular circumstances: the devil is in 
the details. In some sense, this is close to the Aristotelian syllogistic model, but Camerarius is 
so focused on the uncertainty of particulars that we cannot call him Aristotelian.23The neglect 
of the particulars is also voluntary, as the following quote shows: 
The [akratic] argument goes as follows: this desire is harmful. Harmful things are to 
be avoided. Therefore, one should not be seized by this desire. But covetousness 
carries the person away, so that he is ordered by this last proposition concerning 
perception: this is pleasant and joyful. Therefore, I enjoy the present pleasure. The 
person does not want to hear or follow the knowledge-based truth, which argues that 
such deeds are wicked and blameworthy. In the same manner, one can explain other 
cases in which one acts against true knowledge and right reason.24 
     These considerations of Camerarius advance significantly from the schematic treatments 
of Luther and Melanchthon. At the same time, they differ from the earlier Aristotelian 
tradition. The weight of empirical particulars and the uneasiness provided by small changes is 
something that we encounter later in Leibniz, for instance, but it is not a main theme before 
Camerarius.  Because of the voluntary nature of the neglect of details, Camerarius is closer to 
late medieval voluntarism than to either Aristotle or the Stoa. It is worthwhile to note that 
while Luther denies akrasia completely and Melanchthon offers it a minor role in our external 
behavior, Camerarius makes akrasia the cause of all evil. The topic that has no conceptual 
place in Luther thus soon becomes prominent in Lutheranism and receives new significance 
as a ground of empirical observation. 
     After Camerarius, Lutherans start to write extensively on akrasia. They often return to the 
Aristotelian and even Thomistic doctrines and do not display much originality. They aim to 
make Aristotelianism compatible with the theological doctrines of the Reformation, 
sometimes even managing to do some creative work towards this goal. Theophilus Golius of 
Strasbourg and Wolfgang Heider of Jena can be mentioned as examples of this development. 
                                                 
21 JOACHIM CAMERARIUS, Explicatio librorum Ethicorum ad Nicomachum, 
Frankfurt, 1578, p. 325. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 147-148. 
22 CAMERARIUS, Explicatio (see n. 21), pp. 325-326; SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), 
p. 148. 
23 CAMERARIUS, Explicatio (see n. 21), p. 326; SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 
148. 
24 CAMERARIUS, Explicatio (see n. 21), p. 326; SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 
149-150. 
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They return to the Aristotelian anthropology, although they continue to use the example of 
Medea and stress the sinful nature of all human beings. In reality, however, their Aristotelian 
anthropology is clearly distinct from Luther’s reductionist doctrine of all humans being either 
wicked or enkratic.25  
 
Early Calvinism 
 
The Calvinist interpretation history of weakness of will is fascinating for many reasons. First, 
Calvin himself launches this history through discussing akrasia already in the 1539 edition of 
his Institutio. Second, Lambert Daneau undertakes an original systematic interpretation of 
akrasia and enkrateia in his Ethices Christianae. Third, the Neo-Stoic influence on this 
discussion seems to be stronger in Calvinism than in the Catholic and Lutheran interpretation 
history.  
      Calvin’s treatment shows familiarity with the basic Reformation ideas of Luther and 
Melanchthon. Calvin discusses akrasia in the context of the so-called theological use of the 
law. This use brings the knowledge of sin. He emphasizes the role of conscience as an 
instance that exercises some influence even in corrupted human minds. Calvin concludes 
therefore, in keeping with Melanchthon, that although sinners try to evade their inner power 
of judgment, the mind at least sometimes opens itself to the judgment of conscience. This 
means that we do not only sin from ignorance and that genuine acting against better judgment 
is possible because of the remaining power of conscience to produce such jugdments.26 
    This leads Calvin to present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of akrasia in terms of 
practical syllogism. Although he attributes this model to Aristotle’s pupil Themistius, it can 
be found in the standard Aristotelian commentaries, for instance, in Thomas Aquinas or 
Calvin’s contemporary John Mair.27 Calvin says: 
Themistius more correctly teaches that the intellect is very rarely deceived in general 
definition or in the essence of the thing; but that it is illusory when it goes farther, that 
is, applies the principle to particular cases. In reply to the general question, every man 
will affirm that murder is evil. But he who is plotting the death of an enemy 
contemplates murder as something good. The adulterer will condemn adultery in 
general, but will privately flatter himself in his own adultery. Herein is man’s 
ignorance: when he comes to a particular case, he forgets the general principle that he 
has just laid down.28 
In this manner, the conscience illuminates the major premises but not the minor ones and the 
sin is indeed to some extent due to ignorance. However, Calvin adds another perspective to 
this discussion as follows: 
Themistius' rule, however, is not without exception. Sometimes the shamefulness of 
evil-doing presses upon the conscience so that one, imposing upon himself no false 
image of the good, knowingly and willingly rushes headlong into wickedness. Out of 
such a disposition of mind come statements like this: 'I see what is better and approve 
                                                 
25 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 151-163 (Golius and Heider).  
26 Institutio christianae religionis, 2, 2, 22. The following English quotes are from 
Institutes of the Christian Religion (ICR, Louisville, 2006). In SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 
1), pp. 164-174 I pay detailed attention to the different editions of Institutio. 
27 For Mair, see SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 83-95. 
28 Inst. 2, 2, 23 (ICR, p. 282). 
  
8 
it, but I follow the worse.' To my mind Aristotle has made a very keen distinction 
between incontinence and intemperance: where incontinence reigns, he says, the 
disturbed mental state or passion so deprives the mind of particular knowledge that it 
cannot mark the evil in its own misdeed, which it generally discerns in like instances; 
when the perturbation subsides, repentance straightway returns. Intemperance, 
however, is not extinguished or shattered by the awareness of sin, but on the contrary, 
stubbornly persists in choosing its habitual evil.29 
     Calvin now employs the favorite example of Melanchthon, namely, Medea’s love. As 
clear-eyed wrongdoing, Medea is for Calvin not a case of akrasia but of intemperance, which 
in the Aristotelian scale is a standard vice. The passage is somewhat idiosyncratic or at least 
non-Aristotelian, as for Aristotle, people performing such wrongdoing are not conscious of 
the better alternative but their mind is entirely fixed on wrongdoing. For our interpretation 
history it is nevertheless significant that the topic of akrasia is discussed by Calvin and that 
the attempts to keep both the Aristotelian practical syllogism and the non-Aristotelian 
example of Medea. His strong doctrine of conscience comes to some extent from Luther and 
Melanchthon. Interestingly, also some Catholic authors, for instance, John Mair, employ a 
strong concept of conscience in their discussion of akrasia.30 
     Among the early Calvinist authors on akrasia, Lambert Daneau is particularly interesting 
for several reasons. He is often considered the first author who launches a Christian ethics, 
understanding ethics no longer as a philosophical but a theological discipline. At the same 
time, he continues both the Aristotelian and the Stoic traditions, as Christoph Strohm’s study 
shows in great detail.31 There is yet another reason why Daneau is particularly significant. 
Daneau is the first author who takes very seriously Martin Luther’s view of the Christian as 
“righteous and sinner at the same time” and consistently applies it to ethics. While 
Melanchthon and Calvin also take over this idea from Luther, they do not work it out in detail 
and do not fully grasp its significance for the analysis of the human condition. The 
Reformation anthropology that has its origins in Luther receives its first fully elaborated 
moral-philosophical expression in Daneau’s Christian ethics. 
      Let me explain briefly what I mean by this claim. Daneau makes a distinction between 
philosophical and Christian ethics. He says that philosophical ethics cannot understand the 
struggle between reason and the appetitive powers properly. Philosophers claim that this 
struggle can be successfully mastered through the repeated practice of good actions, but they 
do not grasp the real cause o appetitive powers, that is, sin. Their view also wrongly ascribes 
the merit of good actions to people, not to God. Only Christian ethics can see that people 
without God cannot do any good. When God’s spirit has renewed them, they can cooperate 
with the Spirit. Even then, humans cannot achieve a perfect virtue in this life. Their Christian 
virtue remains an enkratic/continent state in which the subjects are not in autonomous control 
of their actions.32  
     When Daneau launches his doctrine of perfect and imperfect virtue, he deviates from the 
Aristotelian tradition already in the number of pages devoted to both. While virtue is defined 
in seven pages, the definition of imperfect virtue, that is, of continence and akrasia, takes 
                                                 
29 Inst. 2, 2, 23 (ICR, p. 282). SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 166. 
30 So SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 86. 
31 CHRISTOPH STROHM, Ethik im frühen Calvinismus, Berlin, 1996. 
32 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 188-200. 
  
9 
eighteen pages.33 Moreover, Daneau undertakes this division with a reference to Stoicism: he 
says that the Stoics teach that the wise can operate at the stage of perfect virtue or duty, 
whereas common people practice the middle level of imperfect virtue. A fully virtuous person 
has extinguished all affects which go contrary to the Holy Spirit, but in the common people 
the harmful passions still struggle against virtue. The virtue of such a person can be 
characterized as wrestling and struggle.34 While Daneau consciously thinks about Stoicism, 
we must also keep in mind that the distinction between the moral states of virtue and 
continence comes from Aristotle. 
     Already Melanchthon uses the picture of wrestling to illustrate the Christian existence and 
the struggle of people like Medea. But Daneau establishes this picture to become a core 
doctrine of ethics: Christian ethics is concerned with virtus luctans, the virtue which 
continuously wrestles with harmful affects. The results of this struggle manifest themselves 
as continence and, in case of failure, as akrasia. Through various references to church fathers, 
especially Augustine, Daneau points out that no human being can achieve true virtue in this 
life because the power and tinder of sin are active in us. Even the apostle Paul could not 
achieve perfect virtue, as Romans 7 shows. Romans 7 is an example of Paul’s continence, not 
of his virtue nor of his weakness of will. This was, by the way, the standard exegetical view 
shared also by Luther.35  
    This means for Daneau that continence is the best stage that Christians can achieve in this 
life. It further means that a textbook on Christian ethics has to focus on the so-called 
wrestling virtue, as it is the option which we really encounter. In this sense Daneau 
systematizes Luther’s view of simul iustus et peccator: he takes seriously the remaining 
sinfulness and claims therefore that full virtue is not the concrete option in ethics, but rather 
the wrestling virtue to achieve strength of will, or continence. And even this imperfect virtue 
is a Christian and not a philosophical virtue.36 It is a virtue that acts in cooperation with the 
Holy Spirit. 
    Concerning akrasia, weakness of will, Daneau differs from Luther insofar as he admits it as 
a distinct possibility. He says, for instance, that  
when the bad will of the mind overcomes the virtue and the desire to act rightly, this 
state is called akrateia. In this state virtue, fights and struggles with vice, and vice 
with virtue. We then clearly perceive as if two persons and two wills were active in 
us.37 
He also uses the example of Medea as an illustration of akrasia as follows: 
When the virtue and the holy desire to do good, which the Spirit of God gives, prevail 
in this wrestling, the will remaining repugnant, it is called continence. Such is the case 
of Jacob wrestling with the angel. But when our harmful desire overcomes reason, it 
                                                 
33 LAMBERT DANEAU, Ethices Christianae libri tres (Geneva, 1583), Book 1, chs. 22-
23. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 190. 
34 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), pp. 99v-100r. 
35 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 101r. I discuss the various stages of the reception 
history of Romans 7 in SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1). 
36 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 107r: “Ergo non animus hominis per se, sed 
animus hominis iam renovatus huius gradus virtutis, quem Continentiam et Luctam 
appellamus, quique solus in nobis hic degentibus esse potest, est capax, illiusque sedes, et (ut 
loquuntur in scholis) verum subiectum.” 
37 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 104v.  
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is called incontinence. Such is the case of Medea in Ovid: “I see the better and 
approve it, but follow the worse.”38 
Although the Holy Spirit will help the believer so that he or she prevails in the wrestling, 
temporary lapses to akrasia may thus occur.  
      The picture of akrasia and wrestling virtue is somewhat complicated in Daneau, because 
he also applies the Calvinist distinction between the elect and the non-elect. The experience 
of wrestling is basically an experience of the elect, as it shows that the Holy Spirit is 
operative in the person. Therefore they will also prevail, being enkratic rather than akratic in 
the long run (although temporary akrasia may occur). The non-elect do not experience a 
similar wrestling, since they remain merely carnal. However, Daneau shares Calvin’s strong 
notion of natural conscience in the sense that even some non-elect feel the pangs of 
conscience and attempt therefore to resist evil. Because they are not elect and do not possess 
the Holy Spirit, their struggle remains akratic:  
[These akratic people] have not renounced their sense of conscience. Because they are 
non-elect, however, they do not possess the renewing Spirit of God, and their 
conscience wrestles alone, bravely resisting the harmful passions; but their conscience 
is overcome by the harmful passions. These people can retain their sound mind and 
produce better fruits more easily [than the vicious]39 
Some brave heathens may nevertheless look like the continent wrestlers; they possess 
something like “shadows” of continence.40 But in reality they cannot possess this Christian 
virtue reserved for the elect. 
     Daneau is highly original in that he works out the Reformation anthropology so that it can 
be consistently applied to the framework of Aristotelian ethics. Obviously, the discipline of 
ethics changes dramatically in this application and becomes Christian rather than 
philosophical ethics. Daneau is one of the major figures of the entire interpretation history of 
weakness of will, since he is the first author to make enkrateia and akrasia the main topics of 
ethics in its entirety. The idea that humans are not capable of virtue but only something like 
the strength of will in cooperation with God becomes a prominent Protestant doctrine. It  
continues to shape the Protestant mentality until our times. Therefore, Daneau may be 
regarded a more faithful follower of Luther than the Lutheran ethicists of 16th and 17th 
century. 
     How do these results relate to the groundbreaking study of Christoph Strohm? I do not 
make Daneau as Stoic as Strohm, who mistakenly thinks that the distinction between 
imperfect and perfect virtue is of Stoic origin.41 Although Daneau mentions Stoicism in this 
context, the distinction itself is formulated in EN VII and discussed in the entire Aristotelian 
tradition of ethics. I nevertheless agree with Strohm in that the very idea of struggle and 
wrestling with perturbations contains something which could be labeled Stoarenaissance in a 
loose sense. Strohm also considers Daneau as very different from Luther, whereas I connect 
Daneau strongly with Luther’s idea of permanent sinfulness.42 
                                                 
38 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 105r. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 194. 
39 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 105v.  
40 DANEAU, Ethices (see n. 33), p. 107r: “Ex quo fit ut in caeteris hominibus, qui hoc 
Dei beneficio carent, non insit vera continentia, sed verae tantum continentiae et luctae umbra 
quaedam ...” 
41 STROHM, Ethik (see n. 31), p. 111; SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 199. 
42 SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp. 199-200. 
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     In addition to this, we may ask whether the anti-Aristotelian criticism of virtue ethics in 
both Luther and Daneau has in itself something that could be labeled as Neo-Stoic. The loose 
concepts of wrestling and perturbations belong to this intellectual current, but one may ask 
whether the emerging Protestantism develops something like a concept of emotions as 
already assented judgments. The Lutheran view that concupiscence is in itself sinful lends 
some support to this idea, as it contains a view of emotion that is culpable in itself. On the 
other hand, the Reformers I discuss do not want to be identified as Stoics and their concept of 
passion and perturbation remains in many ways Aristotelian. The new Reformation 
anthropology thus remains somewhere between Aristotle and the Stoa. 
      There are nevertheless some indications that especially the second generation of 
Calvinists adopts consciously some elements of the Stoic theory of emotions as judgements, 
without explicitly subscribing to this theory.  Lambert Daneau has a fascinating theory of 
inner mental training in which the person looks at the immediate pleasure and pain he or she 
feels in the pursuit of virtuous renewal. The mental powers have a unity in which one can 
train something so that the pain felt first may transform into pleasure. Daneau says, for 
instance: 
The pleasure and pain which we feel in the practice of virtue or vice is strongly 
indicative of their progress and perfection. Those who enjoy the most in doing good 
progress the most. Those who rejoice only slightly know that that they have 
progressed only slightly in the pursuit of virtue and true renewal. Those who enjoy 
doing evil the most are more gravely incontinent.43 
This doctrine is so rudimentary that it is difficult to evaluate it in detail. The idea of 
mentoring oneself seems to ascribe some cognitive content to the very concept of emotion. 
With the mentored change of this content the emotion itself changes; therefore the emotion 
can be trained. 
    There is another early Calvinist who is more Neo-Stoic than Luther or Daneau. This is the 
Ramist scholar Theodor Zwinger. While he claims to be Aristotelian he also considers that 
the appetite performs some reasoning. For instance, he can describe the struggle of the akratic 
mind as follows:  
A struggle between reason and appetite emerges, reason concluding one way, appetite 
another. Both employ a mode of reasoning: reason truthfully, appetite in a false 
manner. We can understand this when we investigate the matter further.44 
     One could in principle say that Zwinger does not really mean the appetite to perform 
reasoning or that he is just a bad Aristotelian. However, Zwinger he speaks repeatedly of 
perturbations as cognitive power. He is a trained physician who defends a unified 
anthropology of body and soul, for instance in the following: 
The affect can move the person forcefully so that the judgment of reason is obscured. 
This can happen with regard to the anger-related perturbations (emerging from anger), 
but also with regard to the perturbations related to concupiscence (emerging from 
venereal appetite). These desires manifestly affect the external body of some people 
                                                 
43 DANEAU,  Ethices (see n. 33), p. 111r. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), p. 198. 
44 THEODOR ZWINGER, Aristotelis Stagiritae de moribus ad Nicomachum libri decem, 
tabulis perpetuis, quae Commentarium loce esse quaenant, explicati et illustrati (Basel, 
1566), p. 212. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), pp.178-179. 
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(so that one can read their faces like a mirror of the soul). When the inner organs of 
the mind suffer, the mind itself seems to suffer.45 
This quote can be read in a Neo-Stoic manner, saying that the mind is one. When a 
perturbation takes over, it also rules the mind with its cognitive capacities. At least Zwinger 
deviates from Aristotelianism and takes very seriously the motif of continuous struggle. The 
picture of struggle and wrestling could be interpreted in terms of Aristotelian or Platonic 
tradition as a conflict between reason and desire. However, this picture becomes so dominant 
in early Calvinism that it breaks the context of traditional Aristotelianism. 
 
Some Conclusions 
 
Given this evidence, we may ask whether we can distinguish the Stoic concept of mental 
struggle from its Aristotelian and Platonic counterparts. In answering this question, I return to 
the old example of the runner who cannot stop running. This example is not found in the 
early modern texts, but it may be argued that the idea of remaining sinfulness and the picture 
of Medea so frequently employed by the authors are similar to the example of the runner. The 
decision to stop running or to reach for a better life is already made and it is not forgotten. 
The body nevertheless follows its old course, at least for a while.  
    For good Lutherans and Calvinists, this “while” lasts the rest of their life; the runner stops 
running only in the death. The Christian ethics of this life describes the procedure of trying to 
stop the running, that is, behaving decently in a situation in which the old course still 
exercises its effects. While I admit that this does not sound quite Stoic, I claim that Luther’s 
simul iustus et peccator and Daneau’s Christian ethics contain features that resemble the 
Stoic example of the runner who cannot stop running. When the Reformers steer their course 
away from Aristotle, they thus approach the Stoa at least to an extent. 
     Let me conclude through highlighting some overall developments in the Reformation 
discussions on weakness of will. Luther denies that carnal people could have a good 
judgment; he further teaches that all Christians continue to struggle with sin. Akrasia and full 
virtue are thus no real options. Melanchthon moderates this teaching, allowing some good 
judgment even in natural reason. However, it is only Camerarius who really launches the 
discussion on akrasia in Lutheranism. While Luther minimizes akrasia, Camerarius 
maximizes it, calling it the source of all evil. Camerarius is closer to early modern empiricism 
than either to Luther or the Aristotelians. After Camerarius, Lutheran ethicists return to the 
Aristotelian tradition.  
     The Calvinist Reformation receives Luther more fully on this point than the Lutherans. 
Calvin himself is close to Melanchthon, the difference being mainly his strong doctrine of 
innate conscience which makes akrasia a real phenomenon. Lambert Daneau takes over 
Luther’s idea that humans move between vice and continence, wrestling with sin through 
their entire life. While Luther does not work out the ethical implications of this idea, Daneau 
does this and develops a full-fledged Christian ethics which has the wrestling virtue of 
continence as its main feature. For this reason, he is also quite interested in akrasia. Daneau 
further attaches a strong doctrine of election to his ethical doctrine.  
     Lutherans threw Aristotle out of the door but he crept back from the window. Before that, 
however, Lutherans had some brilliant new ideas on akrasia, especially Camerarius who 
came to be influential until the times of Leibniz. The Calvinists kept Aristotle out more 
                                                 
45 ZWINGER, De moribus (see n. 44), 211. SAARINEN, Weakness (see n. 1), 177. 
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consistently, since they took over the Lutheran idea of permanent sinfulness and made it their 
core ethical doctrine. The outcome of this process, the new discipline of Christian ethics, or 
the ethics of wrestling virtue, resembles the old Stoic idea of the runner who cannot stop 
running. This example was not used in the discussion, but the other prominent example 
advocating the same idea, that of Medea, was constantly referred to. Obviously, the Christian 
idea of remaining sinfulness cannot be reduced to Stoicism. Its roots can rather be found in 
late Augustine. The discussion whether Augustine’s view of emotions and human action can 
be interpreted in a Stoic fashion is thus intimately connected with the issues of Neo-Stoicism 
in the Reformation.  
